Key Takeaway: The Supreme Court denied certiorari of the D.C. Circuit’s holding that works created entirely by autonomous AI systems are categorically ineligible for copyright under the Copyright Act. Thus, even though the Copyright Act does not expressly define “author,” human authorship is required for copyright protection.
In Thaler v. Perlmutter, 130 F.4th 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2025), the D.C. Circuit addressed a pivotal question as to whether a non-human machine can qualify as an “author” under the Copyright Act of 1976, despite it lacking an explicit definition of the term. In a decision with significant implications for generative artificial intelligence (“AI”), the court held that copyright protection requires meaningful human creative authorship and does not extend to works created entirely by autonomous AI systems.
Dr. Stephen Thaler attempted to secure copyright for a visual artwork titled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” which was autonomously generated by his AI system, “The Creativity Machine.”
In his application, Thaler named the AI as the sole author and himself as the owner based on his creation and operation of the system. The U.S. Copyright Office denied the application, citing its longstanding requirement that only works with human authorship qualify for copyright protection—a decision that was subsequently upheld by both the district court and the D.C. Circuit upon review.
The court grounded its analysis in several provisions of the Copyright Act that presuppose a human author, such as copyright term being measured by the author’s lifespan, granting inheritance rights to heirs, ownership and transfer provisions requiring legal personhood, and vesting rights in an author capable of holding property. Taken together, the court reasoned, these features of the statute reflect Congress’s assumption—consistent with pre-1976 historical practice—that authorship originates from a human agent, with machines serving only as tools rather than independent creators. Because the work in question lacked any human authorship, it was deemed categorically ineligible for copyright.
The court rejected Thaler’s attempt to invoke the work‑for‑hire doctrine, noting that the provision presupposes a valid copyright interest, which cannot arise where a non‑human entity is the purported author. Thaler also waived arguments that he himself should be deemed the author by expressly identifying the machine as such.
Although the court’s decision in Thaler v. Perlmutter leaves unresolved issues regarding the precise level of human involvement needed for copyright protection in AI-generated works, it makes clear that outputs generated entirely by generative or autonomous AI remain uncopyrightable under current law. The Supreme Court’s denial of Thaler’s petition for certiorari on March 2, 2026, essentially applies this principle nationwide, reinforcing the need for practitioners to thoroughly document meaningful human creative contribution when seeking copyright protection for AI-related works. Any changes to this framework will now likely require action from Congress, shifting the ongoing debate over AI copyright authorship from the courts to legislative policymaking.
The D.C. Circuit’s human-authorship holding parallels the Federal Circuit’s patent decision in Thaler v. Vidal, which similarly held that an AI system cannot be named as an inventor under the Patent Act.
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