MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD. v. LG ELECTRONICS INC.
Before Dyk, Prost, and Hughes. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Summary: An order resolving all liability issues starts the clock for the 30 day time limit to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), even if it does not resolve all damages issues.
Mondis Technology Ltd., Hitachi Maxell Ltd., and Maxell, Ltd. (collectively, “Mondis”) sued LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”) for infringement of a patent covering a video display configured to receive video signals from an external source. The jury found that the asserted claims were valid, LG’s televisions infringed, and LG’s infringement was willful. The jury awarded Mondis $45 million in damages. LG filed motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the issues of invalidity, non-infringement, damages, and willfulness. In a first order, the trial court denied LG’s post-trial motions on invalidity, non-infringement, and willfulness. In a second order, issued seven months after the first order, the trial court granted LG’s motion for a new trial on damages. Two weeks after the date of the second order, LG filed an interlocutory appeal challenging, inter alia, the validity, infringement, and willfulness rulings.
The Federal Circuit dismissed LG’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals on “judgment[s] . . . which would otherwise be appealable to the [Federal Circuit] and [are] final except for an accounting.” 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) sets a 30 day time limit to file such appeals. The Federal Circuit held that under § 1292(c)(2) a judgment is “final except for an accounting” when “all liability issues have been resolved, and only a determination of damages remains.” The first order resolved all liability issues. The first order, not the second order, started the 30 day time limit for the appeal. Thus, LG’s appeal, filed approximately seven-and-a-half months after the first order, was untimely. The Federal Circuit found this construction of § 1292(c)(2) was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
Editor: Paul Stewart
