Key Takeaway: In Cox Communications v. Sony Music, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that an internet service provider (ISP) cannot be held liable for contributory copyright infringement based on knowledge alone that some subscribers use its service to infringe copyrights. The decision reaffirms that secondary copyright liability requires proof of intent, established only through inducement of infringement or the tailoring of a service for infringing purposes, with potential implications for technology companies, social media platforms, and generative AI services.
In a unanimous decision issued March 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court the scope of secondary copyright liability for internet service providers (ISPs), reversing a lower‑court ruling that had exposed Cox Communications to nearly $1 billion in statutory damages for its subscribers’ music piracy.[1] Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment reaffirms how intent, knowledge, and enforcement obligations are evaluated in the digital age.
Background
Sony Music Entertainment (“Sony”) and other record labels sued Cox Communications, Inc. (“Cox Communications”) for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement after detecting widespread peer-to-peer music piracy by subscribers of Cox’s internet service. Plaintiff, Sony, a household name in the entertainment industry, is the largest music publisher in the world, managing over 6 million songs in its portfolio.[2] Defendant, Cox Communications, is a major American telecommunications company, and the largest private provider of broadband internet in the United States.[3]
The case originated during a two‑year period from 2013-2014, when Sony’s monitoring agent sent Cox more than 163,000 infringement notices tied to specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Although Cox maintained a graduated enforcement system through warning users, temporarily suspending service, and occasionally terminating accounts, it terminated relatively few subscribers for copyright violations.
A jury in the Eastern District of Virginia found Cox vicariously and contributorily liable for the copyright infringement and awarded approximately $1 billion in statutory damages.[4] On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the damages award and reversed the finding of vicarious liability but affirmed contributory copyright infringement, holding that Cox’s continued provision of service to known infringers was sufficient to establish liability.[5]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether knowledge plus continued service can establish contributory copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court’s Holding
Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that an ISP cannot be held liable for contributory copyright infringement simply for providing internet access with knowledge that some users are infringing copyrights. Instead, the Court reaffirmed that contributory copyright liability requires intent that the provided service be used for infringement. Such intent may be shown in only two narrow circumstances:
- Inducement: the provider affirmatively encourages or promotes infringement through specific acts; or
- Tailoring: the provider offers a service designed for infringement or lacking substantial non‑infringing uses.
Applying this standard, the Court found that Cox did neither. Cox contractually prohibited infringement, sent warnings, suspended accounts, and did not market or design its service as a piracy tool. The Court held that failing to terminate every repeat infringer, even after receiving infringement notices, did not demonstrate the requisite intent.
The Court also rejected arguments that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor implicitly imposes a duty to terminate infringers. [6] Justice Thomas emphasized that the DMCA creates defenses, not affirmative obligations, and does not expand underlying copyright liability where intent is absent.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and rejected the billion‑dollar liability theory in its entirety.
Relationship to Prior Precedent
The Court grounded its reasoning in established secondary‑liability precedent, including Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (Betamax) and MGM v. Grokster.[7] In Sony Corp., the Court held providers not liable for infringement, when the service had substantial non-infringing uses. Comparatively, in Grokster, the Court held providers who actively induced infringement (i.e., those who took intentional steps to encourage users’ piracy) liable for copyright infringement. The discussion of past decisions highlighted the Court’s reasoning that knowledge that some users will misappropriate legitimate services has never been enough to trigger either vicarious or contributory copyright infringement. Thus, mere awareness of unlawful use does not equate to intent.
Concurring Opinions: A Note of Caution
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurred in the judgment but warned that the majority opinion may go too far in cabining contributory liability. The concurrence expressed concern that limiting liability to only inducement or tailored services could undercut the DMCA’s incentive structure and leave copyright owners with minimal recourse against large‑scale infringement facilitated by intermediaries. Justice Sotomayor grounded this analysis in the common law doctrine of aiding and abetting, which the Court addressed most recently in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh and Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos.[8] Nonetheless, the concurrence agreed that Cox’s conduct did not satisfy any recognized theory of secondary copyright liability.
Practical Implications
The decision in Cox Communications v. Sony Music confirms that ISPs and other service providers are not liable for copyright infringement solely based on a failure to terminate users after sending infringement notices, so long as they do not encourage piracy or design services for unlawful use. Technology companies outside the ISP context, including cloud storage providers, social media platforms, and generative AI services, may also benefit from the Court’s emphasis on intent and functional design, rather than knowledge alone.
For copyright owners, the ruling limits the ability to bring claims against intermediaries based on repeat infringement notices alone. Instead, copyright owners may need to rely on direct enforcement against infringing users of the service.
The Court’s ruling also upholds the status quo of the internet. A broad interpretation of secondary copyright liability could incentivize ISPs to ban internet users based merely on accusations of infringing activity at their IP address. As the Concurrence noted, such action could dangerously curtail law-abiding individuals’ access to the internet, as a single IP address can host hundreds to thousands of people simultaneously.[9]
Conclusion
Cox Communications v. Sony Music clarifies that an ISP cannot be held liable for copyright infringement merely by continuing to provide internet access, even with knowledge of infringing activity by its users. By rejecting expansive theories based on knowledge and inaction, the Supreme Court reinforced a high bar for contributory copyright infringement: one grounded firmly in intent, inducement, and design.
While the decision shields ISPs from catastrophic liability, it also raises broader policy questions about whether existing copyright frameworks remain adequate for addressing large‑scale digital infringement. For now, the message from the Court is clear: knowing is not enough.
[1] Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment, 607 U.S. ___ (2026).
[2] Sony Music Publishing, Sony Music Publishing, https://www.sonymusicpub.com/en (last visited May 7, 2026); Music Business Worldwide, Sony: Total Number of Music Copyrights Managed by Global Publishing Operation (2017-2024), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/data/sony-total-number-of-music-copyrights-managed-by-global-publishing-operation/ (last visited May 7, 2026).
[3] Cox Communications, Cox Communications About Us, https://www.cox.com/aboutus/home.html (last visited May 7, 2026).
[4] Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, 464 F. Supp. 3d 795 (ED Va. 2020).
[5] Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, 93 F. 4th 222, 236 (4th Cir. 2024).
[6] 17 U.S.C. §512.
[7] Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417 (1984); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 913 (2005).
[8] 598 U. S. 471 (2023); 605 U. S. 280 (2025).
[9] 24-171, slip op. at 12 (2026) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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